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ABSTRACT 
Proponents of the ‘practice turn’ in the social sciences rarely mention American 
pragmatism as a source of inspiration or refer to pragmatist philosophy. This strikes us 
as not only odd, but also a disadvantage since the pragmatist legacy has much to offer 
practice theory in the study of organizations. In this paper we want to spell out the 
theoretical similarities and divergences between practice theory and pragmatism to 
consider whether the two traditions can find common ground when gazing upon 
organization studies. We suggest that pragmatism should be included in the ‘tool-kit’ of 
practice-based studies of organizations. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Associate	  Professor	  Anders	  Buch,	  PhD,	  Department	  of	  Learning	  and	  Philosophy,	  Aalborg	  University	  Copenhagen,	  A.C.Meyers	  Vænge	  15,	  2450	  Copenhagen	  SV,	  Denmark,	  Phone:	  +45	  20999910,	  Email:	  buch@learning.aau.dk	  	  
	   2	  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Have you noticed that social science has made a turn, a ‘practice turn’, and that the 
notion ‘practice theory’ has made its way into the field of organization studies?  Have 
you also noticed that proponents of this turn and theory rarely mention American 
pragmatism as a source of inspiration or refer to pragmatist philosophy? For example in 
Davide Nicolini’s new book, “Practice Theory, Work and Organization” (2012), he 
does not devote a chapter to pragmatism in spite of his claim for it to be ‘an 
introduction’ to practice theory and in spite of his acknowledgement that practice theory 
is influenced by a broad range of philosophical perspectives. It is not that we do not like 
the book because we do, and we recommend it to our students and use it in our classes 
when we teach. But when we read what Nicolini claims that a practice theoretical 
approach provides, it reminds us of pragmatism. We quote: 
 
 “The appeal [of practice theory, aus] lies in its capacity to describe important features 
of the world we inhabit as something that is routinely made and re-made in practice 
using tools, discourse, and our bodies. From this perspective the social world appears 
as a vast array or assemblage of performances made durable by being inscribed in 
human bodies and minds, objects and texts, and knotted together in such a way that the 
results of one performance become the resource for another. As such, practice theories 
potentially offer a new vista on all things organizational (and social)” (Nicolini, 2012: 
2).  
 
Compare this to the following quote from John Dewey’s “The Need for a Recovery of 
Philosophy” (1917 [1980]):  
 
“(…) experiencing means living; and that living goes on in and because of an 
environing medium, not in a vacuum. (…) Experience is primarily a process of 
undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in 
the literal sense of these words. (…) Experience is no slipping along in a path fixed by 
inner consciousness. (…) Since we live forward; since we live in a world where changes 
are going on whose issues means our weal or woe; since every act of ours modifies 
these changes and hence is fraught with promise, or charged with hostile energies – 
what should experience be but a future implicated in the present!” (Dewey, 1917 
[1980]: 7-9, Dewey’s punctuation). 
 
In our reading, both Nicolini and Dewey are trying to say that practice/experience is a 
concept that situates humans in the social and material world in an entwined way 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Both are also seeing the potential of practice/experience 
for understanding human activity and controlling the future.  Thus, in our 
understanding, Nicolini’s characterization of the practice theoretical vista seems to 
come very close to positions occupied by classical American pragmatists. Similarly, 
Schatzki’s introductory chapter in the anthology “The Practice Turn” (2001), that 
outlines the intellectual heritage of contemporary practice theoretical positions only 
mentions the works of G. H. Mead and John Dewey in passim, and not as a major 
source of affiliation or inspiration. Not only does Schatzki not reference pragmatist 
authors as an inspiration for his practice theoretical approach, he in a later publication 
presents his approach as “a new type of social ontology that has emerged in the last 
three decades” (2005: 465). Also, Reckwitz (2002) only in a footnote mentions “the 
tradition of classical American pragmatism in the work of Dewey, James and Mead” as 
having a “rather loose relation to practice theory” (2002: 259).  
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In this paper, we invite you on a journey, which we have just begun, to find out not why 
contemporary scholars of practice theory as for example Nicolini, Schatzki and 
Reckwitz refrain from including the pragmatist legacy in their writings. This question 
would probably either be entirely speculative or maybe even not very interesting? 
Rather, we want to spell out the theoretical similarities and divergences between the 
theories to consider whether the two traditions can find common ground when gazing 
upon organization studies. It is impossible to cover all organization studies inspired by 
practice theory, and we probably have not found all the studies drawing on pragmatism. 
Instead, we will focus on the writings of central figures in pragmatism and practice 
theory, namely Dewey and Schatzki. It is in the spirit of both practice theory and 
pragmatism to reach out, to try to bridge ideas by talking to other traditions rather than 
shut themselves off in a closed closet (Bernstein, 1989; Nicolini, 2012; Sullivan, 2001), 
and as one of the contemporary pragmatist philosophers says with reference to Dewey’s 
“Experience and Nature” (1925 [1981]): “To be human is to be engaged in practices” 
(Boisvert, 2012: 109).  
 
To back up our argument, we will, firstly, compare and discuss the positions of 
proponents of practice theory and of pragmatism in order to establish the traditions’ 
convergences and elicit their potential discrepancies. In relation to practice theory, we 
take our point of departure in Schatzki’s work since we consider his writings the most 
explicitly theorized account of contemporary practice theory. Regarding pragmatism, 
we primarily present work by Dewey because this is what we are most familiar with and 
since Dewey’s work can be considered to embody classical American pragmatism. 
Secondly, we will investigate the possible discrepancies. Are they fundamental and 
insurmountable or can they in fact be mediated? We conclude our discussion by 
reflecting on the possible benefits and advantages of establishing a closer dialogue 
between practice theory and pragmatism in the field of organization studies and thereby 
outlining new research prospects in relation to organizational learning. 
 
 
2. PRAGMATISM AND PRACTICE THEORY 
The lacking dialogue between practice theory and pragmatism can presumably be 
attributed to historical contingencies in academic disciplinarity. Pragmatism emerged as 
an intellectual and philosophical tradition in the USA in the mid-nineteenth century as a 
response to the ‘metaphysical’ climate of the time that was preoccupied with 
understanding and justifying how thought could represent, describe and mirror reality 
(Menand, 2002; Misak, 2013). Pragmatism rejected traditional accounts suggested by 
rationalist and empiricist philosophers and instead proposed that thought should be seen 
as a product of organism’s interaction with the environment, essentially as ‘action’.  
Practice theory, on the other hand, emerged as a synthesizing intellectual tradition 
approximately 30-40 years ago in the social sciences (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; 
Ortner, 1984; Taylor, 1995) and was philosophically underpinned through references to 
the work of the young Heidegger and the late Wittgenstein.  Later on sociologist like 
Andreas Reckwitz (2002) and philosophers like Joseph Rouse (1996, 2003) and 
Theodore Schatzki (2002, 2005; 2001) has thoroughly developed the approach into 
what has recently been labeled ‘post-classical practice theory’ (Turner, 2014). Like 
pragmatism, practice theory stresses a non-representationalist and non-dualist account 
of human activity. Pragmatism and practice theory thus springs from different 
philosophical and intellectual traditions and the literature only vaguely associates the 
traditions as having intellectual kinship.1 We will, however, argue that not only do the 
two traditions share many perspectives and arguments, they also hold different 
resources that could potentially complement each other in accounting for activity and 
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promoting a practice-based approach to organizational studies. To reach this conclusion 
we will introduce Dewey’s philosophy on human experience and Schatzki’s theory on 
social practices and subsequently discuss the perspectives’ convergences and potential 
points of collision. 
 
2.1. John Dewey on experience 
For the pragmatists and Dewey, meaning and meaning making derives from the lived 
experience where humans are at work with their environments in an entangled manner 
and on a continuous basis. Rather than to understand theory and action as two different 
activities and phenomena, pragmatism regards concepts as tools for actions and as such 
instrumental in coping with situations and events, which may lead to a (re-)constructing 
of meaning and action by working with concepts in an experimental way. All 
educational aspirations, however, begin with an emotional sense that ‘something is not 
right’. We are as humans embedded in the world, and it is as participants (and not 
spectators) we have experiences, which are not just our own personal experiences, but 
experiences that come from being enmeshed in the world. Experiences provide us, 
through learning, with abilities to act in a mindful (‘intelligent’) way using the present 
and history to anticipate the future. Another Deweyan concept, inquiry, is a method for 
constructing knowledge in a systematic way from experience. Dewey also called his 
pragmatism ‘experimentalism’ and ‘instrumentalism’ in order to stress the playfulness 
between ideas and action, and his ideas of concepts and theories as tools that act as 
‘instruments’ in our pursuit to understand and communicate with selves and others. This 
latter also reminds us that different ways of framing actions leads to different solutions 
and consequences. 
 
Opposing the reflex arc sequence of stimuli-idea-response, Dewey prefers to talk about 
an ‘organic unity’ in which the organic refers to us as humans enmeshed in our 
environments (Dewey, 1896 [1972]). We do not stand outside and look into the world, 
we are a part hereof, and we act as parts of the world, and an example of this 
situatedness of stimulus is hearing a sound:  
 
“If one is reading a book, if one is hunting, if one is watching in a dark place on a 
lonely night, if one is performing a chemical experiment, in each case, the noise has a 
very different psychical value; it is a different experience. In any case, what precedes 
the ‘stimulus’ is a whole act, a sensori-motor co-ordination. What is more to the point, 
the ‘stimulus’ emerges out of this co-ordination; it is born from it as its matrix; it 
represents as it were an escape from it” (Dewey, 1896 [1972]: 100).  
 
A sound is not an independent stimulus, because the meaning of it depends upon the 
situation in which it is heard. Nor is the response an independent event that merely 
follows from a stimulus. The response is part of defining the stimulus, and a sound has 
to be classified as a specific kind of sound in order to be followed by a relevant 
response. This classification has to be sufficiently exact to hold throughout the response 
in order to maintain it. The response is therefore a re-action within the sound and not to 
the sound. The solution is in other words embedded in the definition of the problem. 
This is why Dewey prefers the term ‘organic circle’ rather than ‘reflex arc’ as a 
metaphor for the relation between being and knowing.  
 
Dewey’s notion of the organic circle contains the outline of his work with defining his 
notion of experience. Thus, experience is a series of connected organic circles, it is 
transaction, and it is the continuous relations between persons and worlds, the social and 
‘natural’. Experience is an understanding of the subject as being in the world, not 
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outside and looking into the world, as a spectator-theory of knowledge would imply. 
The person-in-world is the foundation for becoming knowledgeable of the world and of 
selves, because it rests upon a bond between action and thinking, being and knowing.  
 
About 20 years after Dewey wrote his article on the reflex arc, he made a comparison 
between his conception of experience and the commonplace and contemporary meaning 
of experience. This led him to the following five differences between the latter 
interpretation of experience and his concept of experience (Dewey, 1917 [1980]).  
 
First, experience is traditionally understood as an epistemological concept in which the 
purpose is production and acquisition of knowledge for example through reflection on 
action. In contrast to this, Dewey’s concept of experience is ontological and based upon 
the transactional relation between person and world. The epistemological orientation of 
experience means that it is possible to overlook situations in which knowledge is not the 
primary content or purpose, and not be able to see that experience is also emotional and 
aesthetic. There is a difference between enjoying a painting because of its aesthetic 
value and studying the painting as an art reviewer (see also Bernstein, 1966 [1967]). 
There are no experiences without some form of knowing but the meaning of the concept 
of experience is distorted if the paradigm for all experience becomes an issue of 
conscious thinking. Most of human lives consist of non-cognitive experiences as we 
continuously act, enjoy and suffer, and this is experience.  
 
It is not possible to understand the meaning of Dewey’s concept of inquiry if the value 
of the aesthetic and emotional experiences in Dewey’s concept of experience is not 
recognised, because inquiry is an answer to a felt (‘emotional’) encounter with a 
conflict in experience, for example a habit is no longer working or valid and needs to be 
changed. Inquiry begins with an emotionally felt difficulty, an uncertain situation, and 
inquiry is a method to resolve this conflict. When something is experienced with the 
‘stomach’ or an emotional response is exhibited in a situation, inquiry is a way to help 
define experience in a cognitive sense and create meaning. To do so, it may be 
necessary to activate former similar experiences by experimenting with different 
possible ways of attributing meaning to the situation at hand and, through that, 
transform the emotional experience into something that can be comprehended as a 
cognitive and communicative experience. This is how an emotional experience becomes 
a reflective one; it becomes a learning experience, and may become knowledge, which 
in turn can be part of informing experience in the next similar experience of an 
emotionally difficult situation.  
 
Secondly, experience is traditionally understood as an inner mental and subjective 
relation rather than a part of the objective conditions for human action that undergoes 
changes through human response. When experience is interpreted as subjective, then 
experience is trapped in the privacy of persons’ action and thinking. There is no 
experience without a person experiencing but it does not mean that experiencing is 
solely subjective and private. Sharing experience is more than a metaphor, because the 
objective world is always weaved into the ‘subjective’ experience.  
 
Third, experience is traditionally viewed in the past tense, the given rather than the 
experimental and future oriented. Dewey’s concept of experience, on the contrary, is 
characterised by reaching forward towards the unknown. In Dewey’s definition, 
experience is connected to the future because ‘we live forward’. Anticipatory and 
forward thinking is more important for action and cognition than recollection. We are 
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not passive spectators who look into the world from the outside, but powerful and 
future-oriented participants in natural and social worlds.  
 
Fourth, experience is traditionally viewed as isolated and specific rather than as 
continuous and connected. For Dewey, however, experience is a series of connected 
situations (organic circles) and even if all situations are connected to other situations, 
every situation has its own unique character. Experience, nevertheless, is so connected 
that it is possible to use experience as a foundation for knowledge and to guide future 
actions.  
 
Finally, experience has traditionally been viewed as beyond logical reasoning. Dewey 
argued, however that there is no conscious experience without this kind of reasoning. 
Anticipatory thinking and reflection is always present in conscious experience by way 
of theories and concepts, ideas and hypotheses. This latter is the most important contrast 
to the traditional interpretation of experience. By on the one hand stressing that 
experience is not primarily an epistemological matter, and on the other hand claiming 
that the systematic process of knowledge is one form of experience, Dewey wanted to 
show how inquiry is the only method for having an experience. Inquiry is triggered by 
difficult situations, and inquiry is the means through which it is possible to transform 
these situations through the mediation of thinking and action. Further, experience and 
inquiry are not limited to what is mental and private. Situations always have both 
subjective and objective elements and through inquiry, it is possible to change the 
direction of experience. We are as humans living, acting and reacting in objective 
worlds, but these transactions are not automatic or blind. Experience is experimental 
and oriented towards the future, and use concepts and theories as instruments to guide 
the process. Dewey viewed education and teaching as a means to support, through 
inquiry, the direction of experience.  
 
 
2.2. Theodore Schatzki on social practices and material arrangements 
Schatzki (1996, chap. 4) broadly characterizes practices as sets of doings and sayings. 
Practices, thus, weave together bodily actions as well as linguistic utterances, gestures, 
etc., and subsume what in other theoretical traditions are labeled as behavior and 
discourse. What unites these actions and linguistic utterances into sets of doings and 
sayings are the specific tasks and projects that impose orderings of the actions. What 
makes us characterize chopping vegetables as part of cooking practices is by reference 
to the tasks (e.g. preparing the ingredients for a meal) and the project (e.g. preparing a 
meal) of which they are a part. Practices are thus composed as hierarchically ordered 
wholes that have certain duration in time and endure as integrative practices. Practice 
thus denotes “(…) performing an action or carrying out a practice (…)” (Schatzki, 
1996, 90). In this sense individuals are carriers of practices because they perform 
specific patterns of actions and thus enact the practice. But practices can also be seen as 
coordinated.  In this sense a practice is seen as a “(…) temporally unfolding and 
spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings” (Schatzki 1996, 89). Schatzki 
characterize practices further: 
 
“Examples are cooking practices, voting practices, industrial practices, 
recreational practices, and correctional practices. To say that the doings and 
sayings forming a practice constitute a nexus is to say that they are linked in 
certain ways. Three major avenues of linkage are involved: 1) through 
understandings, for example, of what to say and do; 2) through explicit rules, 
principles, precepts and instructions; and 3) through what I will call 
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‘teleoaffective’ structures embracing ends, projects, tasks, purposes, beliefs, 
emotions and moods.“ (ibid.).  
 
In this understanding of practices, it is an essential claim of practice theory that the 
performances of individuals are linked and interconnected in specific ways that forms 
durable nexuses of actions. The configurations of the actions, doings and sayings, can 
endure in time and space and thus ‘carry’ constellations of actions. It is important to 
notice that practices are not social structures that steer actions, on the contrary, 
individual actions contributes to the (de)stabilization of patterns of actions by enacting 
the patterns or deviating for the patterns of actions. 
 
The regularity of the doings, sayings, tasks, and projects does not have to be constant 
over time in order to qualify as practice. Practices can change and innovate over time, 
and it is a matter of empirical investigation to trace these changes as they unfold. But 
for doings and sayings to qualify as part of a practice, it is essential that regularities can 
be detected and disruptions are outbalanced by continuities.  
 
For Schatzki, practices thus indicate that human activities are linked through certain 
normative orderings. One essential ordering element is the practical understandings of 
the actors. Actions are considered competent and qualified according to standards and 
procedures, mostly implicit and tacit by nature. When chopping vegetables you must 
know how to handle a knife. You must be able to judge why and when it is appropriate 
to chop carrots. Practice theory emphasizes that these activities are founded in the 
practical skills and know-how that actors acquire through participation in practices and 
through drill. Practical understanding displays an ability of knowing ‘how to go on’ and 
having ‘a feeling for the game’, thus acting according to the prevailing standards of the 
practice. The acquisition of the skills is very much a matter of bodily incorporation and 
drill and training is important in learning how to follow rules and partake in ‘a form of 
life’ (Wittgenstein 1958 [2009], §218ff.).  
 
Another ordering element is the explicit rules, regulations, instructions, standards, and 
procedures that are pertinent for specific practices. In cooking practices cooking books 
comprise recipes and algorithms for producing meals, there are enforced legal 
regulations for food preparation in restaurants and conventions for when to cook for 
breakfast, lunch and dinner. These explicit rules are very much based on conventions 
and bear huge regional and cultural differences. But they are essential in shaping the 
practices of cooking.  
 
Schatzki sees teleoaffective structures as a third ordering element that links doings, 
sayings, tasks, and projects in practices:  
 
“[…] teleoaffective structures establish, inter alia, a field of correct and acceptable 
ends, a selection of acceptable or correct projects to pursue for the sake of those ends, a 
variety of acceptable or correct tasks to carry out as part of those projects, a range of 
acceptable or correct ways of using objects, and a variety of acceptable and even 
correct emotions, feelings, and passions” (Schatzki, 1996: 124).  
 
The structures need not be explicitly conscious goals to, or ends in view for the actors, 
but should rather be seen as structural signifiers that give an overall sense to actions. 
Schatzki emphasizes that these structures are recurring effects of actions and should not 
be conflated with structuralist accounts. Teleoaffective structures emerge when there is 
general agreement about what is acceptable or unacceptable to do in situations. The 
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presence of teleoaffective structures does not exclude controversy or disagreement 
about specificities but provides an overall sense of purpose and direction for the 
activities. The structures both produce the practice and are produced by the practice. As 
an example teleoaffective structures are enacted in cooking practices when chefs are 
developing new tasty courses for restaurant visitors or when parents are preparing 
nutritious meals for their children, the actions are performed with a normativized end in 
view, for a purpose.   
 
A final ordering element relates to the general understandings that are available to and 
shared by actors within a practice, though these general understandings, as the word 
indicates, are not proprietary of specific practices, but are generally shared norms and 
values. However, they are also active in structuring specific practices. Cooks often 
endorse certain religious, ethical, ideological, or maybe even political norms. Many of 
these might e.g. be codified in religious scriptures or ideological manifests, but they 
need not be explicitly stated to be conductive. These general understandings, thus, often 
span different practices and can make them overlap at specific junctures in history.      
These ordering elements of practices are not meant to be jointly exclusive or exhaustive 
characteristics. On the contrary, the elements are combined in the doings, sayings, tasks, 
and projects of the practice in complex and interwoven ways. Thus, the specific 
constellation of these, and maybe other elements compose the uniqueness of the 
practice. Furthermore, practices are always situated in specific orders or arrangements 
that comprise both practices and non-human/material objects. The arrangements and the 
social practices thus jointly constitute the overall site where things exist and events 
happen (Schatzki, 2002: 63). Sites are a special kind of contexts, namely the kind where 
practices unfold in activities and events. To put this point another way, sites are the kind 
of contexts where actors’ ends and human intentions matters. Sites are, thus, not only 
locations in objective time and space or even activity-place space, but they are also 
significantly teleological located. Sites are part of ‘wider scenes’ of events and 
activities. The chopping of the carrots is an activity that is part of the event of preparing 
a meal. Likewise, the preparation of the meal is part of a project about supplying 
nutritious food for family members, and this project, in turn, a part of a wider project of 
living a healthy life, etc. Sites are nested. For an event or activity to occur within a site 
is tantamount to that event or activity being a constituent part of that context. Activities 
and events are both contained in the site, but also an integral part of the sites makeup. 
Finally, it is important not to regard the ordering elements as ontological entities. The 
ordering elements should rather be viewed as phenomenological constituents that render 
social phenomena intelligible and that helps us as social scientists better understand the 
dynamics and processes that lead to the emergence, persistence and dissolution of 
practices.  
 
In his account of social practices, Schatzki sees practices as separate from, but 
intimately related to, material reality. He describes the relationship between material 
arrangements and social practices as one of prefiguration. For material arrangements to 
prefigure social practices means that material arrangements affects social practices by 
“(…) the channeling of the physical causality that laces through the social site” 
(Schatzki, 2002: 201). We can, thus, say that cooking practices, like any other social 
practices, are channeled by the physical occurrences that affect human activity and more 
specifically that cooking practices are affected by the interplay with physical objects in 
for example kitchens, when cooks heats ovens, when ingredients in meals do not 
‘conform’ as initially predicted, when fruits are not fresh, etc. As cooking practices 
often try to engage with and change material arrangements cooking practices are thus 
also shaped by the interaction with physical objects, for example when micro ovens 
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became part of standard kitchen equipment. Materiality should thus play a significant 
role in our accounts of how practices evolve, transpire and change. 
 
2.3. Convergences and potential points of collision 
When we compare Dewey’s conception of experience to Schatzki’s notion of social 
practice, and disregard their different terminologies, quite a few similarities and 
agreements can be mentioned. Alas, space does not allow us go into a thorough textual 
comparison of Dewey’s and Schatzki’s writings, but let it suffice to just mention the 
most obvious points of convergence. 
 
Dewey and Schatzki agree that experience/meaning and intelligibility in social practice 
is not primarily and originally propositional, interpretative and representational. Instead 
it should be construed through actors’ practical and often habituated doings and 
engagements with the world. Schatzki’s practice theory draws on Heidegger’s 
phenomenological notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Schatzki, 2002) and Wittgenstein’s 
concept of ‘intelligibility’ (Schatzki, 1996) in order to counter Cartesian 
representationalism. Dewey’s concern is likewise to ‘recover’ philosophy from the 
subject-object split that has tormented Western thinking (Dewey, 1917 [1980]) as well 
as to depart from the sense empiricists because the world does not consist of qualities 
but of ‘things’ (Dewey, 1925 [1981]; 1939: 19). Thus, both strive to overcome 
epistemological dualisms and bifurcations and to reconstruct human activity on 
ontological terms. Both agree that human activity is misrepresented when construed as 
primarily a cognitive enterprise performed by isolated, albeit interacting individuals. 
Instead, activity is better understood as both a processual and relational phenomenon. 
Humans are according to Heidegger ‘always already’ engaged in social activity as 
actors driven by their passions, emotions, objectives, projects and ends in view. For 
Dewey the non-cognitive is also always before the cognitive experience, and he praises 
“things experienced by way of love, desire, hope, fear and other traits characteristic of 
human individuality” (Dewey, 1939 [1988]: 33). We relate to our environment through 
transactions (Dewey & Bentley, 1949 [1991]) and teleoaffective structures (Schatzki, 
2002: 80). The way the world is made intelligible and the way we relate to our 
environment is through actions as they unfold in social sites, in time-space and 
teleoaffective locations (Schatzki, 2002: 63 ff.; 2010: 65 ff.) or as situations (Dewey, 
1938 [1986]: 66 ff.). Humans’ relation to the world is not one of the disengaged 
‘spectator’ or a decoupled ‘mind’ that interprets reality from outside the world. Instead 
experience is organism’s anxiously and hopefully ‘undergoing and suffering’ in their 
physical and social environment turned into meaning (knowledge or ‘intelligence’ as 
Dewey would  term it) (Dewey, 1917 [1980]) and intelligibility and understanding 
should be conceived as actors’ teleoaffectively structured doings as they transpire in 
constellations of social practices and material arrangements (Schatzki, 1996: 128).  
 
Both Dewey and Schatzki agree that experience/intelligibility is produced by purposive 
socially mediated doings saturated with affects and emotions and tempered by the 
physical arrangements that embed bodily activity. The social ontology in Dewey’s 
pragmatism and Schatzki’s practice theory has in common the critique of Cartesian 
subject-object dualism, of mentalism and psychologism, and other dualisms. They both 
strive to develop their theorizing of experience/intelligibility according to a non-
representationalist ontology. Furthermore, their ontologies do not naively stipulate a 
predefined inventory of ‘reality’ but they pay attention to the (social and 
‘natural’/material) events and phenomena that confront us as practice unfolds and we 
inquire more about the nature of the world. This sets of the ontologies on a processual 
and relational path, the knower and the known, (wo-)man and the world, are not set 
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apart, but intimately intertwined in action. Another point of convergence concerns the 
role Dewey gives to ‘habit’ in social conduct, and how Schatzki theorizes practical 
understandings according to tacit, routinized and drill induced patterns of behavior.  
 
Now, these fundamental and general convergences must not delude us to overlook the 
potential points of collision between the perspectives. Schatzki’s practice theory draws 
heavily on the later Wittgenstein and Heideggerian phenomenology whereas Dewey’s 
pragmatism is fundamentally naturalist and to some extent claimed to be even 
scientistic (Papenhausen 2002). More authors have pointed out that naturalism and 
phenomenological approaches do not sit comfortably together (Aikin, 2006) or at least 
diverge on some important issues (Okrent 1988 & 2013). As Schatzki’s practice theory 
draws heavily on the phenomenology of Heidegger as developed in “Being and Time” 
(1927), we need, briefly, to discern the points where pragmatism and Heidegger’s 
phenomenology part ways. Okrent (1988 & 2013) argues that Heidegger’s 
phenomenology in many ways is in fact pragmatist. Heidegger shares with pragmatism 
the fundamental intuition that our relationship with the world is fundamentally and 
originally practical. We engage with the world not unmediated. Our engagement with 
the world is mediated by our constitution as organisms (pragmatism) or as ‘Dasein’ 
(Heidegger). These constitutions of ours disclose/brings forward the world in certain 
ways, as something or other. A lion discern the world as prey and non-eatable objects, 
birds discern trees as nesting places, and humans accordingly give meaning to their 
world directed by their practical endeavors. Both pragmatists and Heidegger agree that 
this ‘as-structure’ is fundamentally practical and pre-reflective. But discrepancies 
between pragmatism and Heidegger can be found in relation to the normativity inherent 
in the ‘as-structure’.  
 
What actually determine how we discern the world as something and not something 
else? Pragmatist’s answer is straightforward: Organisms are biological systems 
(embodied experience) that discern their world in holistic ways according to what is 
useful for their perseverance and growth, this is the lesson learned from evolutionary 
biology. Dewey is clear that there is continuity between man and lower organisms and 
that organisms are in and of the world, and that organisms’ (including humans) adapt to 
their environment by refining their ‘as-structure’ to obtain adequacy. This is at the 
essence of Dewey’s concept of ‘inquiry’ and his instrumentalism, and at the heart of this 
instrumentalism lie a naturalistic normativity and a biological teleology (cf. Nagel 
1977).  
 
Dewey, however, includes human action in his understanding as well as the 
experimental method pointing forward to solve social problems. This is a red thread for 
example in his work on democracy and his belief in education (Dewey, 1916 [1980]; 
Westbrook, 1991). Dewey talks about an “individual who evolves and develops in a 
natural and human environment, an individual who can be educated” (Dewey, 1925 
[1984]: 20) and compares his pragmatism to the French philosophy of the 
Enlightenment (Dewey, 1925 [1984]). Also, Dewey talks about how human beings are 
subject to the influence of culture including means of communication, which is why 
Dewey talks about ‘acculturated organisms’ (Dewey, 1939 [1988]: 15).  
 
Heidegger’s notion of the ‘as-structure’ is different. He does not see Dasein as primarily 
directed by biological normativity. For Heidegger Dasein’s intentionality differs from 
that of lower organisms in the sense that it occupies a different modality, namely that of 
possibility instead of actuality. For Heidegger Dasein is the only being that has the 
possibility to engage with being as being and this sets Dasein in a position to transcend 
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limited means-ends relations and engage with the world in new and different ways. 
These ways of engaging with the world are not primarily regulated by biological 
normativities. Okrent summarize the difference between Heidegger’s version of 
pragmatism from the classical pragmatist stance as follows: 
 
“Because Dasein’s world is structured in terms of social rather than biological 
normativity, however, no for-the-sake-of, no way of Dasein’s being is anything other 
than contingent, and that contingency is evident in the various social worlds that 
Dasein encounters in the course of being itself. Dasein thus always engages with itself 
as possibly not being as it is. By its very character as Dasein, Dasein’s being is an issue 
for it, or problematic for it, because Dasein always engages with itself as possibly not 
being there. And, because the for-the-sake-of that Dasein is is also that in terms of 
which things have their significance, the problematic character of Dasein’s being 
extends to the problematic character of the being of other entities. Things have their 
significance only in light of a for-the-sake-of, but any for-the-sake-of is engaged by 
Dasein as possibly not being, so the significance of every thing is engaged by Dasein as 
possibly not being. And these possibilities in turn allow for the possibility of engaging 
with the things that in fact are, as things that are, as entities, as beings.” (Okrent 2013, 
pp. 153-4, emphasis in original)    
 
In this rather convoluted Heideggerian terminology Okrent makes it clear that for 
Heidegger the normativity of the as-structure resides in Dasein’s special mode of being 
as that kind of entity that considers its own being as problematic as opposed to other 
biological organisms that do not engage with themselves as possibility. 
 
Now, this detour into Heidegger’s phenomenology makes it apparent that there are 
potential points of collisions between naturalistic pragmatism and Heideggerian 
phenomenology in relation to how these approaches construe normativity as they 
account for organisms’/humans’ engagement with the world. Does this also hold true 
for the relationship between pragmatism and practice theory? Does Heidegger’s anti-
naturalism make practice theory anti-naturalist?  
 
 
2.4 Naturalism and social normativity 
For one thing, Schatzki is very clear that his ontology, like Dewey’s, does not separate 
the social from natural events. For Schatzki, social life is part and parcel of nature, the 
site of the social transpires in and amongst material arrangements and human beings are 
corporeal agents that are engaged with and affected by nature (Schatzki, 2002). But we 
need to discern what kind of naturalism we are considering when we ask if practice 
theory is in fact compatible with Dewey’s naturalism and we need to consider what kind 
of normativity we are invoking to account for social activity.  
 
To address these central questions we turn to Joseph Rouse (2002) who reclaim 
naturalism and thereby argue that practice theoretical accounts of the social is in fact 
compatible with naturalism. Rouse distinguishes between two kinds of naturalism: 1) 
meta-philosophical naturalism, a position that claims that we ought to seek continuity 
between the best empirical sciences and philosophy/social sciences, and 2) metaphysical 
naturalism, a position that holds that we ought to seek continuity between the natural 
facts and laws disclosed within the natural sciences (i.e. scientific phenomena) and 
philosophy/social sciences. Meta-philosophical naturalism understands scientific 
practices as endeavors that best represent our reality. It trusts science to produce the 
most truthful representations of natural, social and historical regularities of occurrences 
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and thereby posit normativity as dispositional regularities that scientist’s hold, thus, 
reducing the social to natural dispositions. But another bread of naturalism, 
metaphysical naturalism, construes scientific practices differently. Metaphysical 
naturalism is non-representational. It concurs that engaging in scientific practices are in 
fact to date our best and most successful way of disclosing reality, but denies that the 
endeavor of scientific practices is aimed to represent reality. We quote Rouse (2002, 
12): “On my account, practices are not meaningful, socially and historically situated 
actions as opposed to inexorable natural processes; they are identifiable by their 
normative accountability rather than by any performative or dispositional regularity; 
and they allow us to understand the modality of causal processes on the basis of the 
normativity of scientific practices rather than the reverse.”  Metaphysical naturalism 
holds that practices, including scientific practices, can be understood through the shared 
normative accountability of its constituent performances. Practices are thus not held 
together by regularities rooted in nature. Such an account would reproduce a 
representationalist metaphysics. Instead the regularities in social practices are constantly 
re-enacted by the normative accountability of the actors in processes of deontic 
scorekeeping (Brandom 1994) or intra-action (Barad 2007). Rouse, like Dewey, thus, 
dissolves the boundaries between fact and value and posit normativity as a fundamental 
element in our engagement with our environment.   
 
Thus, the prima facie collision between Deweyian pragmatism and Heideggerian 
inspired practice theory on issues concerning naturalism can in fact be resolved by 
advancing metaphysical naturalism. We venture that Dewey’s naturalism is in fact 
metaphysical and not meta-philosophical. The non-representationalist ambitions of 
pragmatism and practice theory draw both positions away from meta-philosophical 
naturalism and towards a metaphysical naturalism.  
 
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS: INCLUDING PRAGMATISM IN THE ‘TOOL-
KIT’ OF PRACTICE-BASED STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Both pragmatism and practice theory has contributed to the field of organizational 
studies. And, particularly the field of organizational learning has a long tradition for 
getting its inspiration from pragmatism (Brandi & Elkjaer, 2013; Elkjaer, 2003). This 
inspiration goes back to the works of Simon in his “Administrative Behaviour” (1947), 
and later also included his colleagues from the Carnegie School (i.e. Cyert and March) 
who began to see how habits by collective and organisational rules, procedures and 
routines were relevant and significant for organisational learning and change (Cohen, 
2007). This understanding of routines or habits as ‘dispositions to act’ rather than 
mindless actions have been of interest to several organization scholars over the years 
(see e.g. Cohen, 2009; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). In defining habits and routines as 
dynamic and not merely repetitive we see a clear point of reference to Dewey’s notion 
of habit. 
 
Also, the notion of inquiry as an experimental method for generating experience and 
knowledge is the focal point in the works by Argyris and Schön who make explicit 
reference to pragmatism in their work on action theory, action science and 
organisational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978, 1996). We quote: “We use ‘inquiry’ 
here not in the colloquial sense of scientific or juridical investigation but in a more 
fundamental sense that originates in the work of John Dewey (1938): the intertwining of 
thought and action that proceeds from doubt to the resolution of doubt.” (Argyris & 
Schön, 1996: 11). For Argyris and Schön, however, the relation between thinking and 
action is sequential; first is mental modelling (cognition), and then action whereas for 
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Dewey thinking and action are intertwined and cannot be separated (Dewey, 1896 
[1972]). 
 
Further, in a recently published paper by Vo and Kelemen (2014), it is claimed that 
“Dewey’s philosophy has influenced different areas of organization studies” (2014: 
240), and we would like to add that pragmatist philosophy has influenced organization 
studies in different ways mirroring the many ways that pragmatism has been and 
continue to be interpreted. These interpretations are for example illustrated in a recent 
edited volume on “American Pragmatism and Organization. Issues and Controverses” 
(Kelemen & Rumens, 2013) in which the editors argue that although pragmatism has 
suffered marginalization for a number of years, “American pragmatism has entered 
what we might dub a ‘third phase’ with new scholars reworking its concepts and ideals 
to maintain its contemporary vitality and relevance” (Rumens & Kelemen, 2013: 4). 
Practice theory too is becoming an influential source of inspiration to organizational 
studies (e.g. Schatzki 2005 & 2006, Gherardi 2006, Nicolini 2013). Both theoretical 
frameworks bring to organizational studies attractive ontological perspectives that 
enable analysis of organizational activity to accommodate the social and material basis 
of organizational phenomena. Nicolini (2013, chap. 9) argue that organizational studies 
can benefit from an eclectic ‘tool-kit’ approach that brings in resources from different 
traditions such as discourse- and conversation analysis, cultural historical activity 
theory, ethnomethodolgy, social learning theory and more. We are of one mind with 
Nicolini’s proposal to bring in different perspectives to elucidate organizational 
practices. However, we suggest that the pragmatist tradition is also brought into the 
plethora of available resources for practice-based studies of organizations.  
 
Rumens and Kelemen show that pragmatism has much to offer organization studies. 
The point of their departure is that they see a polarization in current organizational 
scholarship between, on the one hand, structuralist positions and organizations 
understood as entities and, on the other hand, social constructivist perspectives in which 
ideas and meanings are central in a processual understanding of organizations. Other 
contributions in Kelemen’ and Rumens’ edited volume point to the ability of 
pragmatism to bridge for example critical realism and ‘interpretivism’ in its insistence 
upon a non-representational and action-oriented form of realism and to focus upon 
organizational practices (Watson, 2013 #3614, see also Simpson, 2009). We would add 
that Dewey first and foremost was an empiricist, and that this was reflected in his notion 
of experience, which is not only action but also undergoing and the creation of meaning 
(knowledge) when combining these phases in experience. Among the contributors to the 
edited book is also an interest in the issue of democracy, which was at the heart of 
particularly Dewey’ pragmatism, and Jacobs (2013) argues that this focus may inspire a 
development of a democratization of institutions. Also, pragmatism is mentioned as a 
source of inspiration when coining a concept of power as coercion versus power as 
capacity, ‘power over’ versus ’power with’ as the pragmatist inspired ‘management 
guru’, Mary Parker Follett, suggested in her work (Hafting, 2013 #3612, see also 
Ansell, 2009). Mary Parker Follett (1924) has indeed been brought to life in recent 
years, and not only regarding her work on power but also as offering a way for 
understanding creative practice as a dynamic social process (Arjaliés, Lorino, & 
Simpson, 2013). Practice theory has just recently begun to expand its focus from pure 
analytical and explanatory concerns to include issues concerning action research, 
intervention and governance (Strengers & Maller 2014, Kemmis & McTaggert 2013, 
Eikeland & Nicolini 2011). In pragmatism a long-standing tradition has dealt with 
organizational transformation and learning and we propose that further practice 
theoretical developments take account of these resources.  
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We see pragmatism and practice theory as companions on a journey in organizational 
studies that has just begun. We argue for increasing mutual recognition and exploration 
of the communalities and strengths of the two traditions, and we believe that this might 
be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.  
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1 The literature that discusses the relationship between pragmatism and practice theory 
is sparse and mainly focus on the relationship between the works of pragmatists and 
Bourdieu (Bogusz, 2012; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Shusterman, 1999), omitting 
references to more recent developments in practice theory. 
